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This paper reviews the history of the National Union of Plantation Workers from its 
origins in the uncertainties of the political outcome of the end of the British colonial 
administrations in the Malayan peninsular through to the dramatic changes taking 
place in the Federation of Malaysia as that country fast reaches industrialised status. 
From its ethnic place in the plura1 order of things under the aristocratic Jed 
Government ofTengku Abdul Rahman, the Indian-dominated NUPW, it is argued, 
achieved little in tenns of real improvements in the lives of plantation workers as a 
confrontational union and has not been all that successful in cooperative and other 
business adventures. As industrial relations have been moulded and remoulded to 
meet the imperatives of a more national scheme of things and competition for 
investors and markets stepped up, the NUPW is likely to be increasingly 
marginalised. overtaken by the rapidity of industrialisation and the structural 
changes which have accompanied it 
A quarter of a century ago Ibe Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tengku Abdul Rahman (1969, 66), 
wrote: 
The National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW), which is predominantly-Indian, is 
by far the largest union in the country and one of the biggest in Asia. It is aligned to no 
political party and its leadership is very influential in the Malayan Trades Union Congress, 
which also stands apart from parties, leaving political activities to individual members' 
own inclinations. 
Since then, both Malaysian indusuial relations and the NUPW have undergone substantial 
changes. Through briefly tracing the history of the transfonnation of the NUPW, it is intended 
in this paper to assess critically the extent to which it fulfils its representative function in the 
interests of its members and to anticipate its role in the future industrial relations of Malaysia. 
Origins of the NUPW 
Until Ibe proclamation by Ibe British colonial aulborities of Ibe state of "Emergency" in 1948, 
most of the plantation trade unions and federations of plantation trade unions in Malaya were 
affiliated to Ibe Pan Malayan General Labour Union (pMGLU) formed in 1946 and soon 
registered as Ibe Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU). Important exceptions 
were the Negri Sembilan Indian Labour Union led by P. P. Narayanan and other regional 
unions, including Ibe Perak Indian Workers' Union, Ibe Alor Gajab Labour Union, the MaIacca 
Estate Employees' Union, !he Johore State Plantation Workers' Union and the Perak Estate 
Employees' Union. For his efforts "To assist and encourage the early development of the trade 
union movement in the Malayan Union on sound and well proven lines", as his directive read, 
Gamba (1962, 100-125) eulogises the British Colonial Office appointed Trade Union Adviser 
Malaya (IUAM), J. A. Brazier. Olbers, notably Dass (1991, 42-44) and Ampalavanar (1981, 
63), suggest that the Brazier's integrity was suspect and that his real brief behind his attempts to 
maintain the labour movement's independence from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was 
to replace militant trade unionism with docile organisations acceptable to plantation employers. 
Basing his case on !he researches of Stenson (1980) and Woodies (undated) Dass describes !he 
TUAM's role as "scurrilous", an~ even cites the then British Trade Union Adviser to Singapore 
as accusing Brazier of forcing the militant unions into political "outlets" by denying them official 
recognition. In the event, Brazier's office was central to the organisation of trade unions that 
fanned the nucleus of the subsequent Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MlUC) in 1950. His 
good relationship wilb English-educated Indians in the civil service enabled him to facilitate !he 
organisation of white-collar trade unions and of the NUPW (Ramasamy. 1994,82). 
In Malaya, Brazier functioned in a colonial environment where the practice of divide-and-rule 
was nowhere so apparent and effective as with the ethnic employment structure of Indian and 
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Chinese. So discriminatory was it that "even the British High Commissioner doubted if there 
was any justification for the great difference between the daily rate of 85 cents for Chinese 
labourers and 55 cents for Indians" (Stenson 1980, 63). Thus, cultural and political differences 
were compounded by a mcial division of labour which inhibited the development of worker 
solidarity and collective bargaining (Stenson, 1980, 138). On the other hand, intent on 
undennining the PMGLU. the WAM fostered independent bargaining by splinter unions in the 
plantation industry. such as The Negri SembiJan Indian Labour Union mentioned above. with 
rubber estate employers (Morais, 1975, 18). 
The Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association (MPIEA) was fonned in 1949 to 
formulate wage policies and coordinate members' industrial relations strategies for collective 
bargaining. In 1952, the MPIEA announced substantial wage cuts for plantation workers in 
spite of the benefits the plantation industries had gained [rom the Korean War boom over the 
previous two years. In response, the leaders of the Negri Sembilan Indian Labour Union. the 
Perak Estate Employees' Union (PEEU), the A10r Gajah Labour Union, the Malacca Estate 
Employees' Union and the lahore State Plantation Workers' Union set aside their factional 
differences to fonn the Pan Malayan Rubber Workers' Union (PMRWU) to resist the 
employers (Ramachandran and Arjunan, 1993. 17). However. the PMRWU was not successful 
and, in 1953, the case was referred to a single Arbitrator whose award (known as the Taylor 
Award) largely supported the employers (Arasaramarn, 1980, 144) and criticised the negotiating 
style and effectiveness of the PMRWU (Ramachandran and Arjunan, 1993,7). 
In September 1954, realising that little was to be gained from regional power bases, the 
PMRWU constituent unions led by Nathan, Narayanan and Choudry of the Plantation Workers 
Union of Malaya. which the Negri Sembilan union had been renamed. and with the blessings of 
the Government. the approval of ~ MPIEA and advise from the WAM and a representative of 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFIU), mellO fonn the NUPW. Since 
its inception under the colonial regime. and since the establishment of an independent Federation 
of Malaysia in 1963, the NUPW has been the main organiser of plantation workers in the 
country. and the plantation workers, as ~ith the union' s leaders, have been predominantly 
ethnic Indian but with an increase in ethnic Malay members reflecting the increase in the 
proportion of MaJays in plantation employment (Ramachandran. 1994.252). 
In 1969, when the Federation of Malaysia. which had included Singapore until 1965. had been 
in existence for six years, Tengku Abdul Rahman (1969. 142) offered the following view of the 
functional and ethnic plurality of the nation's politics: 
For-many years now United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) has aligned itself with 
the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) and the MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) to 
fonn the Alliance Party. While UMNO looks after politics as its main platform. the MCA 
continues to help build up business confidence in the country, and the MIC' s influence 
among the industrial and manual group of workers has helped to bring about industrial 
peace in the country. All three working hand in hand have not only brought peace and 
prosperity to the country but have helped provide vast funds for rural developmenl 
However, 1969 was a critical year in Malaysian political development for on 13 May underlying 
ethnic strife was made manifest in violent rioting. Important as that was, the focus of this paper 
is on industrial relations in Malaysia and here the Tengku's assessment of the role of the NUPW 
quoted in the introduction has proved to have been largely correcl 
Gamba (1962) observed that the NUPW leadership was content for its members to remain 
largely Indian in order to relain hegemony and because it was administratively convenient. evcn 
though the exclusiveness may have been at the expense of il"i bargaining power. Likewise. 
Tengku Abdul Rahman left indusuial relations to the Malaysian Indian community. For 
example, in 1969, the Minister of Labour. Tan Sri Manickavasagam, was an Indian and also the 
Deputy Presidenl of the MIC, a component of the three pany alliance led by the Tengku, and the 
officials of the MTUC. of which the NUPW was the most important affiliate, were 
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predominantly Indian. 1bc disproportionate-to their numbers in the population (10 per cent) 
and the workforce, that is--representation of the Indian community in the labour movement 
proved something of a drawback in mobilising the workforce. 
The Role of NUPW 1954-1990 
From its origins, the communal organisation or plantation workers and the nurturing of English· 
~ducatcd Indian labour leaders by the colonial authorities inhibited the NUPW as a trade union 
and trade unionism as an institution in Malaysia. According to one observation: 
The evolution of trade unionism in MaJaysia has been marked by repressive legislation 
impairing the functions and activities of the trade unions from 1940 up to the present day. 
The history of the trade union movement has heen chamcleriscd not by a lack of able, 
motiva~ individuals. but by the syslCmatic wIXding oul of mdical leaders and strong 
unions. What is left today. then arc mainly "yellow". "company" or "rice and fish" 
unions, a typical example or which is the National Union of Plantation Workers. (The 
Institute of Social Analysis. 1989,60) 
This viewpoint is not shared hy other ohservers some of whom contend that the NUPW has 
been highly successful in representing the inleresL'i of iL'i members. According to ArasaraUtam 
(1980: 148), not only has the NUPW dealtcffcctivcly with wages and working conditions, but 
it has "functioned with a great dl.!a1 of effectiveness as an instrument of sociaJ welfare. Its 
leadership at all levels, from the national executive to the representative in each estate division, 
has always been moved by a purposeful sense of Indian upliftmenl." Arasaratnam (1980, 151) 
points to the assistance the NUPW has given to the children of estate workers for their school 
education. extended in 1963 to univerSity education and subsequently included the provision of 
student hostel accommodation in Kuala Lumpur and provincial capitals. He lists the projects. 
from the provision of adult education to the eradication of alcoholism in which the NUPW has 
engaged itself and its fostering of social mobility by its encouragement of rank-and·ftle 
participation and succession in the union's governance. All in aU, he opines. the NUPW is the 
best organised trade union in Malaysia and that iL'i organisation along commonaJ (Indian) lines is 
responsible for it being so. 
Ramachandnm (1994). on the uther hand, is ffim\! drcumspcct. He suhjecL .. the NUPW's 
response to estate restructuring. iL" negotiations for the improvement'> to working conditions, its 
wage negotiations and its contributions to generally uplifting the quality of life of its members to 
criticaJ review. Estate restructuring was associated with the disengagement of British companies 
as Ma1aya approached independencc. Speculating buyers of estates sold off plantations and, 
particularly close to town'i and cities, subdivided land for further sales; plantation workers were 
laid off and there was a substantial reduction in the standard of employment conditions for those 
remaining employed. In 1957, a Government committee (the Aziz Committee) set up at the 
request of the NUPW did not recommend Government intervention 10 regulate the subdivision 
of estates (Arasaramam, 1980, 155), but after sub-division had continued unabated, in 1963, a 
commissioned rcpon was made to Parliament which recommended legislative measures to halt 
sub·division and recommended a rehabilitation program. A minority repon from the European 
and Chinese planters represented on the Azjz Committee disagreed with the majority's 
recommendation. 1be Government rejected the call for new legislation and the MIC, which was 
part of the Government, was powerless. Instead the MIC set up the National Land Finance 
Company (NLFC). a cooperative venture. to counter sub·division and the aJienation of Indian 
workers. However. by 1966 the NLFC owned only six estates amounting to 4,860 hectares and 
employing 2.000 workers. The NUPW had established only one estate cooperative (Stenson, 
1980. 206). Ramachandr.m (1994. 26 1) regards th is as a failure by 'the largest and most 
affluent union in the coumry .. .... 
Awards and collective agreemenL\· 
The first agreement between the NUPW and the employers. the MPIEA. was signed in 1954. In 
subsequent agreements, the NUPW's achievements have, according to Ramachandran (1994). 
been limited. Ramachandran argues thal the increase in annuaJ paid holidays from three to 19 in 
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1964 was more due to the implementation of the Fmployment Act 1955 than to the NUPW's 
persistence, and only brought entitlements into line with the workforce in general. Benefits that 
look good on paper, he surmises tum out not to be so good in reality. While there may be 
increases in hospitalisation benefits, for example, the primary health care on the plantations 
remains woefully inadequate, and the housing allowance does not keep pace with inflation and 
is payable to only one member of a family. He further claims that communal bousing is 
inadequate and water and electricity supply are sO' rationed as to not meet national standards. A 
house ownership scheme to provide for plantation workers' retirement has not materialised on 
any scale, although a two-tier provident scheme has been operating. 
The 1954 collective agreement between the NUPW and the MPIEA fixed the daily wages of 
rubber tappers and field workers at $M2.40 and $M2.05 respectively. However, in 1955, rather 
than bargain a new agreement, the MPIEA sought a wage cut and passed on an increase in 
export duty to the employees, urging their union to resist further increases in export duties. 
Eventually a compromise was reached, but a revised collective agreement brought few benefits 
to estate workers. (Ramachandran, 1994, 265-266). In 1956, the NPWU put in a claim for a 
basic wage of $M4.50 per day for field workers and commensurate increases for rubber tappers 
which the MPIEA flatly rejected. Department of Labour intervention led to a reduction in the 
NPWU's demands but not to concessions from the employers. The NUPW organised a "go 
slow" on consecutive Fridays and a militant climate ensued on the estates which worried the 
Government and NUPW leaders. In the end the NUPW settled for a rate of SM2.6O a day, far 
short of their original demand. 
Although technology and new varieties of rubber trees have over the years increased the 
productivity of rubber plantations-a worker who tapped 250 trees a day in the mid-1950s since 
the 1990 collective agreement taps- around 600 trees a day-the NUPW has not achieved 
commensurate increases in plantation workers' wages. In !he 1960s there were marginal 
increases---5 cents a day for tappers and 30 cents for field workers-and; in 1962, to cover 
rained-off days, a guaranteed minimum wage of SM2.25 was conceded by the employers. 1be 
NUPW's renewed demand for a guaranteed daily rate on all plantations was resisted by 
employers and the resultant calls for militant action by the union were stifled by Government 
mediation. 
Industrial peace was maintained in the mid 1960s during the "Emergency" declared as a result of 
the young Federation of Malaysia's intimidation by Indonesia, but in 1966 the NUPW renewed 
its claims on the employers, who had then reformed as the Malaysian Agricultural Producers 
Association· (MAP A). The NUPW was more successful this time, partly because under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 an Industrial Coun was established. In 1968, The Industrial Coun 
increased rubber tappers' wages by 55 cents-from $M2.55 to $M3.10 a day (Ramachandran, 
1994.272), The field workers did not receive an increase but the award included payments for 
scrap latex collected. a task bonus, overtime rates, holiday loading and daily rates for tapping, 
although the last for an increased number of trees per day-from 450 to 465. 
The strategy of the employers had been to keep basic rates low in the 1950, and 1960s so that 
workers' incomes could only be supplemented by productivity increases. With the introduction 
of new high yielding varieties of rubber trees although" the basic rates were increased the 
threshold for productivity payments was raised. As a result, the NUPW leaders were faced with 
a rank-and-fiJe revolt and were forced to lodge new claims in 1969. Wage increases were won 
but labour issues were in any case subordinated by the communal riots of 13 May 1969 and the 
third "Emergency" since the end of the Second World War. 
The 1972 agreement retained the same basic rates but increased incentive payments. Tappers, 
however, were now required to tap 500 trees a day. In 1976, although tappers gained a 40. per 
cent wage increase and gender equity was achieved for field workers. the quota of trees was 
increased to 600 a day, rubber prices had increased lOOper cent and there had been significant 
money inflation which had diluted real wages. In 1982. the NUPW embarked on a campaign to 
replace a daily-rated payments system to a monthly-rated one but without success. Its leaders 
argued that while productivity had doubled over 20 years real wages had only increased by 12 
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per cent, that monthly accounting was more compatible with the calculation of the national 
poverty line. and that it would be colUistent with requirements in the Employment Act With 
their credibility on the line the NUPW leaders pursued their claim vigorously against employer 
intransigence and through conciliation and arbitration procedures. In spite of the union's 
resoluteness. in 1986. the lndustrial Court rejected the claim for a monthly pay system but 
increased the basic wage for tappers and field workers to SM7.90 a day. Ironically- and this 
did not help its case-the NUPW did nOl operate a monthly-rated paymenLc; system on its own 
estates. Failing again to elicit concessions over the payments system in 1990 the NUPW called a 
three-day strike which was ended by the Government referring the dispute to the Industrial 
Court. The resultant consent award increased daily wages by about 85 cents but failed to grant a 
full monthly-rated payments system; rather the award guaranteed a minimum of 24 days work 
per month .. 
Business ventures 
The NUPW, like tra~ unions elsewhere. has set up its own businesses. As early as 1967 it 
founded a public limited compaoy, Great Alloners Trading Corporation (GATCO) financed by 
members and by bank loaos. The following year the National Multi-Purpose Cooperative 
Society was established and bought two rubber estates, GATCO having bought another. By 
1989, GATCO included holdings in eight businesses ranging from textiles to vehicle assembly. 
However, it has been argued (Ramachandran, 1993, 47-48 and 1994, 288, 291) that the 
business ventures have not benefited the rank-and-file members of the NUPW. Many of the 
ventures have failed and others have accumulated substantial losses. The collapse of a 
Sugarcane Smallholders Settlement Sebeme left 200 settlers stranded and Chempaka Negri 
Lakshimi Textiles company proved to be a means of benefiting relatives of union officials. 1be 
children of rank-and-fIle members who had their scholarships and study loans suspended and 
their hostel accommodation mortgaged did not fare so well as the sons of their leaders. 
An Assessment 
It is claimed that the NUPW has not been able to improve the conditions of its members much 
above the poverty level. Marginal increases in hourly wage raleS and fringe benefits have not 
raised the standard of living in the way that the adoption of a complete monthly~rated payments 
system might have done. If it looked like becoming militant in the pursuit of its members' 
interests. the NUPW found that the Government was quick to use its powers to order 
mediation. According to Amam (Far Eastern Economic-Review. 7 June 1990): 
Malaysia's plantations have been worked mainly with the muscle and sweat of generations 
of Indians since the 19th century. when the rust indentured labourers were brought in to 
help produce cheap rubber for Britain's industrialisation. But poverty begets poverty: 
Indians still dominate the plantation workforce. living in conditions that range from basic 
to dismal. ... Although several large fonnerly British plantation operations like Guthrie and 
Sime Darby are now owned and run by Malaysians. there is no need to look to India for 
cheap labour-sons and daughters of earlier migrant workers maintain the tradition in the 
rubber plantations. though a new wave of Indonesian immigrants provides much of the 
labour on the oil palm estates. 
Neither independence nor the 'MaIayanisation' of capital and labour have significantly changed 
the working and living conditions of plantation labourers. In contrast revelations in 1989 did 
nothing to halt a membership decline. As reported by Ramachandran (1993, 56): 
TIle NUPW members' confidence in their union was further eroded in mid-1989 when the 
daily newspapers. Tamil. English and Malay, exposed the union 's income and 
expenditure pattern. The union members pay a monthly subscription of $M5. They have 
recently discovered that 90 per cent of their total conuibutions went towards salaries • 
allowances, expenses of the union establishment and other payments which did not 
benefit members. Thus. some of the members felt that the union leaders were much more 
interested in their salaries than the workers' welfare which. and this contributed to the 
decline in membership, is now close to 70,000, following the three·day strike in February 
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1990 and the implementation of monthly [guaranteed 24 days] wages. However. this does 
not mean that the union has won the workers' confidence. 
The $M77 ,000 and $M60,OOO annual salaries of the Executive Secretary and the General 
Secretary of the NUPW respectively contrast with eight to ten dollars a day ' earned by its 
members. In addition, the union's office bearers are ex-officio directors of companies owned or 
part-owned by the NUPW for, as Ramacbandran (1994, 285) notes, ' Inspired by the 
corporatist and accommodationist unions in Singapore, with which the leadership of the NUPW 
is increasingly identified. the union leadership sought to fonn cooperative societies among its 
members and to venture into business activities.' The pursuit of business objectives, contends 
Ramachandran, has led to a conflict of roles for the NUPW in that the pursuit of profit is 
irreconcilable with representation of the interests of labour. For example, when textile workers 
sought, with the support of the MfUC, to form an industry-wide union. the NUPW lent no 
support, perhaps because it was an employer of textile workers itself. 
With the Government's imperative for Malaysia to become an induslrialised country by 2020 
and public policy being to favour enterprise trade unionism the future of the NUPW does not 
look too bright. Observation of the Asian NICs would suggest to policy makers that workforce 
discipline and compliant trade unions were necessary for their having achieved industrialisation 
and therefore worth emulation. As economic development proceeds changes in industrial and 
occupational structures are also likely, if events elsewhere are reliable indicators. to mitigate 
against independent confrontational trade unions such as the NUPW. In Malaysia. as 
manufacturing, construction and even mining have increased their contributions to Gross 
Domestic Product (GOP) agriculture's has declined-from about 60 per cent in the 1950s to 20 
per cent in the 1980s (lomo, 1989, 57). Kuruvilla (1995, 40) succinctly sums this up as 
follows: 
Malaysia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and in many ways a 1bird 
World success story. Twenty years of sustained growth and diversification have reduced 
the economy's reliance on primary products, such as tin and rubber. Malaysia is still the 
world's largest exporter of palm oil, and a significant producer of oil. natural gas and 
timber. More recently, it has become one of the largest manufacturers of semiconductors 
and a sizeable manufacrurer of electronics, electrical products and textiles. Exports 
account for about 61 percent of gross national product (GNP). which makes the economy 
very dependent on the external economic climate .... 
Citing Arudsothy and Littler (1993), Kuruvilla continues: 
Foreign investment in Malaysia continues to increase, attracted by the favourable 
investment policies. the cheap. docile and skilled labour. and the well developed 
infrastructure .... Industrial relations in Malaysia have recently been characterized as 
becoming highly repressive and trade unions as weak. excluded by the government in 
decision making at national levels. and having very little influence at the workplace level. 
While trade unionism in manufacturing remains weak due to the Government's regulating 
industrial relations to meet the demands of multinational corporate investors. the NUPW has 
had to fight against cheap labour policies and the practice of contract labour in a substantially 
more unionised industry-unsuccessfully according to Sharma (1985, 52). Bravennan (1974) 
saw subcontracting as a transitional form in the stages of management control of the labour 
process which is eventually jettisoned for direct control. So far this has not been the case with 
Malaysian plantation workers where labour has been used as a commodity since the days of 
indentured labour brought from India by the British. Subcontracting in the Malaysian plantation 
indusUy has ensured a ready reserve supply of labour in the event of prolonged industrial action 
by unionised plantation workers (Ramasamy. ]994; Ramachandran. 1994). 
In his analysis or posl-colonial Malaysian society Tengku Abdul Rahman saw the Indian 
community. through lhe MIC. playing an importanl role in the country's industrial relations. 
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This was not in spite of but rather because of the facllhat the MlUC was dominated by Indian 
office bearers and the largest affiliate of the MTUC was the NPWU. itself dominated by Indian 
ofticc hearers and with a predominant Indian mcmhcrship. Drawing on Bot (1988), past hoc 
categorisation sees the period from the 1950s to 1977 as essentially (lne (If restricted pluralism 
'based on the belief that workers required some degree of fair and humane treatment but also 
reflecting the view that economic development goals had supremacy over unfeucrcd trade union 
right .. ' (Kuruvilla. 1995. 47). With the shirt from an import substitution economic growth 
strategy to export OIicnlCd industrialisation in the 1970s the Malaysian Government' s industrial 
relations policy shiflCd to one of repression. exclusion and cost containmcnt. this now hcing 
modified by the move towards human rusoun.:c management (HRM) as the means of workforce 
control (Kuruvilla. 1995.48). Il has been public policy to prevent the attainment of one national 
trade union federation by an amalgamation of the MTUC with the Congress of Unions of 
Employees in the Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS) and more recently the Government 
has supported a riva1 federation in the Ma1aysian Labour Organization (MLO). Thus the ethnic, 
economic. organisational and political environments in which the NUPW was established and 
became prominent have undergone some dramatic shifts such that its like is unlikely to be seen 
again in Malaysia, 
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